In the seventies and eighties, the theory of exhaustible natural resources developed a branch, 
Introduction
The oil price shocks in the seventies increased the interest for the theory of the supply of raw materials from exhaustible natural resources, which dates back to the seminal work of Hotelling (1931) . Salant (1976) suggested to characterize the supply side of the oil market by one big cartel and a large number of small suppliers called the fringe. This market structure was thoroughly analysed in a number of papers: Pindyck (1978) , Salant (1982) , Schmalensee (1980a, 1980b) and Ulph and Folie (1980) . These studies all employ the Nash equilibrium concept. Gilbert (1978) put forward that in order to characterize the market power of the cartel the von Stackelberg equilibrium concept might be more appropriate. The idea is that the cartel can determine its extraction path rst and the suppliers in the fringe can only react, which is actually bene cial for the cartel. However, this equilibrium has the unpleasant property that the cartel's strategy is time-inconsistent: the optimal extraction path ex ante ceases to be optimal ex post, when the analysis is done again at a future point in time, which means that, in the absence of binding commitments, the cartel has an incentive to renege on the announced extraction path (Ulph and Folie (1981) , Newbery (1981) , Ulph (1982) , Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (1992) ). This problem attracted a lot of attention (Karp and Newbery (1991 ,1993 ), but up to now the literature does not provide a time-consistent solution for the cartel-versus-fringe model.
Time-inconsistency is a paradoxical concept. In the models employed so far it is assumed that the suppliers choose their extraction paths on the basis of information about all initial stocks of the resource only. In the check for time-consistency it is suddenly assumed that the suppliers also have information about all stocks of the resource at the current point in time.
However, this implies that the strategy space is changed because now it is assumed that the suppliers can condition their extractions on the current stocks of the resource. The paradox is that in checking whether such an equilibrium is time-consistent or not strategy spaces are used which normally yield di erent equilibria than the one considered. In the theory of di erential games this paradox is treated as follows (Ba sar (1989) ). Equilibria in which the suppliers only know the initial resource stocks are called open-loop equilibria, whereas equilibria in which the suppliers condition their extractions on the current resource stocks are called closed-loop equilibria. Open-loop equilibria are weakly time-consistent if reconsidering the extraction paths at any point in time, given the equilibrium resource stocks at that point in time, does not change the extraction paths. If this is not the case the equilibria are time-inconsistent. In the literature described above the conclusion was that the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium of the cartel-versus-fringe model is time-inconsistent for some economically relevant parameter values. In order to remove this undesirable property one has to require that the extraction paths are in equilibrium at any point in time for any value of the resource stocks at that point in time. Note that this equilibrium is of the closed-loop type. Moreover, the resulting time-consistency is stronger in the sense that the suppliers not only will have no incentive to renege on their strategy if time passes by but also no incentive to renege when the value of the resource stocks for some reason di ers from the expected one, for example as a consequence of a new oil deposit discovery. Therefore, this equilibrium is called strongly time-consistent. It is customary in the literature on di erential games to use the name feedback equilibrium, but one also nds designations like credible, Markov perfect or rational expectations equilibrium.
This paper provides the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium for the cartel-versus-fringe model with linear demand and constant marginal extraction costs which was introduced by Ulph and Folie (1981) and Newbery (1981) 1 . The point of departure for the analysis is the open-loop equilibrium as given in Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (1990) . The extraction paths depend on the relative position of the marginal extraction costs and the choke price.
In some cases the open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium is weakly time-consistent. It will be shown that these extraction paths can also be supported by a feedback equilibrium, so that the outcome is even strongly time-consistent. In cases where the open-loop outcome is time-inconsistent we will derive the extraction schedules that are supported by a feedback equilibrium. The result is, however, not unique for some cost con gurations. It depends on the parameter values which schedule will be chosen by the dominant player, the cartel.
Section 2 presents the cartel-versus-fringe model and section 3 summarizes the open-loop cases. In section 4 the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation is derived for the value function of the cartel which characterizes the feedback equilibrium. Section 5 presents the result of this paper: a strongly time-consistent equilibrium for the cartel-versus-fringe model. The appendices contain most of the mathematical calculations.
The cartel-versus-fringe model
The supply side of some markets for exhaustible natural resources, such as the oil market, can be characterized by a large coherent cartel and a big number of small suppliers called the fringe. The cartel has initial resource stock S c 0 and extracts E c (t) at time t with constant marginal extraction costs k c . Similarly, each fringe member has initial resource stock S f 0i and extracts E f i (t) at time t with constant marginal extraction costs k f ; i = 1; ; N, where N denotes the number of fringe members. The dynamics of the extraction of the resource stocks 1 Karp and Tahvonen (1995) consider the case of extraction costs which depend linearly on remaining stocks. This facilitates the analysis considerably. We stick to the original model. 
where the extraction rates and the stocks have to be nonnegative at any point in time.
The demand function is assumed to be linear with a so-called choke price p indicating that above this price there is no demand for this resource, for example because of the availability of a backstop technology. It follows that in market equilibrium the price p is a linear function of total supply:
The marginal extraction costs k c and k f are assumed to be smaller than the choke price p, because otherwise either the cartel or the fringe or both will not exploit the resource and the problem is not interesting. 
for the cartel and the fringe members, respectively. The discount rate r is assumed to be constant and the same for all producers.
In order to characterize the market power of the cartel two steps are suggested. First, the Ulph and Folie (1981) , Newbery (1981) and Ulph (1982) . These results had to be slightly modi ed because the e ect of a negative shadowprice for the stock of the fringe had been ignored in the decision problem of the cartel (see Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (1992) ). The results depend on the cost con guration and can be nicely presented by the position of two price trajectories and one marginal cost trajectory. De ne P f (t; f ) = k f + f e rt ; (6) P m (t; c ) = 1 2 (p + k c + c e rt ) ;
MC(t; c ; c ) = k c + ( c ? c )e rt ;
where f is the (constant) shadow price for the fringe with respect to its own stock, and c and c are the (constant) shadow prices for the cartel with respect to its own stock and the stock of the fringe. These shadow prices are of course not exogenously given but are part of the solution. The price P f is called the competitive price, because this price results whenever the price-taking fringe produces, and the price P m is called the monopoly price, because this price results when the cartel is not constrained by the fringe. MC denotes the marginal costs of the cartel for producing at the competitive price and consists of the extraction cost plus the shadow price of loosing one unit of its own stock plus the shadow price of leaving one unit in the stock of the competitor (note that c is negative).
The results are summarized in gures 1-6.
insert gures 1-6 about here]
If k f > 1 2 (p + k c ) either gure 1 or gure 2 applies. If the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively large, the cartel produces rst at the monopoly price and then at the competitive price after which the fringe produces. If the initial resource stock of the cartel is relatively low, only the last two stages occur. It is not di cult to see that the equilibrium of gure 2 is weakly time-consistent. If for some t 2 (0; t 1 ) the equilibrium is reconsidered the only di erence with the original problem is that the stock of the cartel has decreased which implies that the equilibrium will not change. The equilibrium of gure 1 is also weakly timeconsistent, because it can be shown that the length of the time intervals t 1 ; t 2 ] and t 2 ; t 3 ] does not depend on the initial stock of the cartel. Therefore, any reconsideration along the equilibrium path will not lead to a change in the extraction schedule.
If k f = 1 2 (p + k c ) the equilibrium is again as in gure 2. If k c < k f < 1 2 (p+k c ) gures 2, 3 and 4 sketch the possible equilibria. There can be either no monopoly phase or only one monopoly phase at the end, or, in addition to that, a monopoly phase between the phases where the cartel and the fringe produce at the competitive price.
The three gures represent the situations where the initial resource stock of the cartel, as compared to the initial resource stock of the fringe, is respectively low, higher and high. In the last two cases the equilibrium is time-inconsistent. This can be seen as follows. The fringe produces before the stock of the cartel is exhausted. If in this production stage the equilibrium is reconsidered it will again start with the common feature of gures 2, 3 and 4, namely that the cartel produces rst at the competitive price. This is di erent from the continuation of the ex ante equilibrium where the fringe produces at the competitive price.
Note also that the price path is discontinuous in these cases, which is another undesirable property of this equilibrium.
If k f = k c gure 5 applies. In fact there are in nitely many equilibria because in the phase of simultaneous production supply is not uniquely divided between the cartel and the fringe.
One of these equilibria is the open-loop Nash equilibrium, which is always weakly timeconsistent. All the other equilibria are time-inconsistent.
Finally, if k f < k c the equilibrium is depicted in gure 6. This extraction pro le is clearly time-inconsistent because after the stock of the fringe is exhausted the cartel will ex post immediately produce at the monopoly price and not rst at the competitive price.
In the absence of binding commitments time-inconsistency is an undesirable property of an equilibrium. In section 5 we will see what happens when time-consistency is required. In the next section the necessary methodology is derived rst.
4 The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation
As was already stated in the Introduction, in order to remove time-inconsistency one has to require that the extraction paths are in equilibrium at any point in time for any value of the resource stocks at that point in time. In fact one requires that Bellman's principle of optimality holds for the equilibrium. This implies that the dynamic programming method yields the result. The central concept in dynamic programming is the value function which denotes at any point in time for any value of the resource stocks at that point in time the equilibrium pro ts-to-go for the supplier. The set of value functions for all suppliers have to satisfy the so-called Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations (see Ba sar and Olsder (1982) 
where p is given by equation (3) and where V denotes the value function, which is a function of time and all resource stocks.
The maximizations in the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations yield the extraction rates at time t as a function of the resource stocks. In the von Stackelberg solution concept the fringe members take the extraction of the cartel as given. They are assumed to play Nash among themselves which, if E f i > 0, yields as rst-order conditions e ?rt (p ? E c ?
If we assume identical fringe members, summing up the equations in (11) and dividing the result by N and then taking the limit for N goes to in nity leads to an expression for the extraction of the aggregate fringe in case the fringe produces. It follows that
If the problem had been set up as if the total fringe acts collectively but takes the price p as given, the same behaviour would have resulted. This means that the aggregate fringe acts as a price-taker. Therefore the original problem reduces to the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman 
where the cartel is restricted by a price-taking aggregate fringe (12) and p satis es (3).
The di culty in this type of problems is to nd the value function. Note also that in this problem the reaction of the fringe is a correspondence and not a function. However, from any given extraction scheme the pro ts-to-go can be calculated and it can then be checked if these pro ts-to-go satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This procedure will be followed in the next section.
5 The feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium In a feedback equilibrium the extraction rates are not only a function of time but also of the current resource stocks. Strong time-consistency means that these mappings remain in equilibrium at any point in time and for any value of the resource stocks at that point in time.
The feedback equilibrium is in that sense robust against unexpected shocks to the resource stocks. Note that the strategies seen as functions do not change but that the actual rates of extraction will change in case of unexpected changes in the resource stocks. In this section it will be shown that the extraction schedules of the weakly time-consistent open-loop von Stackelberg equilibria are also supported by feedback equilibria and hence are also strongly time-consistent. Furthermore, the feedback equilibria will be derived for the cases where the open-loop equilibrium is time-inconsistent.
In section 4 it was shown that the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium is characterized by the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation (13) First we concentrate on the extraction schedule of gure 2 where the cartel starts producing at the competitive price followed by the fringe. We have to show that at each time t between 0 and t 1 for each set of resource stocks S c and S f it is optimal for the cartel to fully supply the market at the competitive price, given by equation (6). The optimality conditions are 
The second optimality condition states that the cartel cannot act as a monopolist, because the corresponding price would be above the competitive price and the fringe would start to produce. The rst optimality condition states that it is optimal for the cartel to have the fringe refrain from producing at the competitive price, because the price minus marginal extraction costs minus the shadow value of one unit less of its own resource exceeds the shadow value of lowering the resource stock of the fringe. Finally, the third condition is the resulting HJB equation that guarantees strong time-consistency.
Because the competitive price P f given by equation (6) equals the choke price p at t 2 , the variable f is a function of t 2 and the parameters p, k f and r. Because the extraction path is known, the pro ts-to-go of the cartel at time t can be expressed in t; t 1 and t 2 , and the parameters p; k c ; k f and r. Furthermore, t 1 and t 2 are implicitly given as functions of t; S c and S f by the conditions that both the cartel and the fringe exhaust their resource stocks.
It follows that the partial derivatives of the value function V c of the cartel with respect to t; S c and S f can be determined (see Appendix A). Tedious but straightforward calculations then show that condition (14) is satis ed for k f > k c , condition (15) 
where P f ; P m and MC are given in equations (6)- (8), expressions for the shadow prices c and c can be derived which then prove to be equal to the partial derivatives of the value function of the cartel with respect to its own stock and the stock of the fringe, respectively (see Appendix A). It follows that the optimality conditions (14) and (15) hold, which can be seen from the position of P f ; P m and MC, and the HJB equation (16) The second optimality condition states that the cartel can act as a monopolist and the rst optimality condition assures that simultaneous production at the competitive price cannot be better for the cartel than producing alone at that price.
The veri cation procedure again involves lots of calculations but is similar in structure to the analyses above (see Appendix B). The intersections of P f with p, P m and MC, given by equations (6)- (8), yield f ; c and c as explicit functions of t 1 ; t 2 ; t 3 and the parameters p, k c , k f and r. The pro ts-to-go of the cartel can then also be written as a function of these variables and t. Exhaustion of the two resource stocks plus the equilibrium condition (see Groot, Withagen and de Zeeuw (1990) c e rs ds = 0 (21) yield t 1 ; t 2 and t 3 as implicit functions of t; S c and S f . It follows that the partial derivatives of the value function V c for the cartel with respect to t, S c and S f can be determined. The last two partial derivatives prove to be equal to c and c respectively, so that optimality conditions (18) and (19) hold, which can be seen immediately from the positions of P f , P m and MC. Furthermore, the HJB equation (20) proves to be satis ed. We can conclude that Proposition 3
The weakly time-consistent open-loop von Stackelberg equilibrium of the form of gure 1, where the cartel produces rst at the monopoly price and then at the competitive price followed by the fringe, is also strongly time-consistent. (22) and (15). The HJB equation becomes (using (22) 
The rst optimality condition now states that the cartel is indi erent on how to divide the production along the simultaneous stage.
The veri cation procedure is much more di cult than in the previous cases because we do This transformation may look a bit strange at rst sight but note that we also have x = e rt?rt 1 ; y = e rt?rt 2 ; z = e rt?rs :
The condition that the resource stocks at t will be exhausted yields the restrictions where E f (s) = E f (s; f ; c ) = E f (x; y; z).
The pro ts-to-go of the cartel can be written as a function of t; x and y. Restrictions (29) de ne x and y as implicit functions of S c and S f , from which the partial derivatives of x and y with respect to S c and S f can be derived. It is now possible, but rather complex, to derive a linear partial di erential equation in the pro ts-to-go or the value function of the cartel (see Appendix C). In this derivation optimality condition (22) is used as well as the property that E f as a function of x; y and z is homogeneous of degree zero. This partial di erential equation can be solved so that we get an expression for the value function of the cartel. It is now straightforward, although again rather tedious, to derive the optimal extraction schedule of the cartel in the simultaneous phase. The optimality conditions (22) and the HJB equation (23) are always satis ed. The optimality condition (15) is satis ed for k f < 1 2 (p + k c ) (see Appendix C). We can conclude that Proposition 4 If k f < 1 2 (p + k c ) the extraction schedule of gure 5, where cartel and fringe rst produce simultaneously at the competitive price followed by a cartel monopoly, is a candidate for a feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium.
For the cost con guration k c < k f < 1 2 (p+k c ) propositions 1 and 4 thus yield two candidates for the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium, Note, however, that in the derivation of the extraction schedule S ! C m we have implicitly assumed that the extraction rate of the cartel is non-negative. In fact, the equilibrium does not always exist. If the cartel has a choice it will pick the extraction schedule with the highest pro t. On the basis of numerical pro t calculations gure 7 shows what will happen. In this gure the initial resource stock of the fringe S f varies on one axis and its marginal extraction cost k f on the other axis. The other parameters are xed: the initial resource stock of the cartel S c is equal to 200 and its marginal extraction cost k c is equal to 50, the choke price p is equal to 100, and the interest rate is set at 10%. The dashed curve indicates the area where the equilibrium S ! C m exists For the cost con guration k f < k c the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium is given by the extraction schedule of gure 5. If the initial resource stock of the fringe is relatively large and k f is small these stages will be preceded by a stage where the fringe produces alone (see gure 7). In order not to complicate this paper any further a proof is omitted here.
The discovery of the extraction schedule S ! C m as a candidate feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium is the major achievement of this paper. Note that this result is in line with the conjecture of Newbery (1993) that the Nash equilibrium might be a good approximation for the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium. It remains to be shown that S ! C m is the only candidate besides C ! F . The cartel will never choose a nal stage S, because it is better to split this into C ! F . A nal stage C is not time-consistent because C m is better. C m as nal stage cannot be preceded by C for the same reason. It can be shown that F ! C m does not satisfy the HJB equation. The proof is very similar to the proofs of the propositions above and will be omitted here. To summarize, the last two stages of the extraction schedule in the feedback von Stackelberg equilibrium for the cartel-versus-fringe model are either C ! F or S ! C m . C ! F always occurs if k f 1 2 (p + k c ) and S ! C m if k f k c . C ! F can be preceded by C m if k f is big and the initial stock of the cartel is relatively large, and S ! C m can be preceded by F if k f is small and the initial stock of the fringe is relatively large. For the con guration k c < k f < 1 2 (p + k c ) there can be a choice and in that case the cartel will pick the one with the highest pro t.
Conclusion
The developments on the oil market in the seventies increased the interest for the so-called cartel-versus-fringe model for the supply side of markets for exhaustible natural resources.
For certain cost con gurations the more realistic models proved to be time-inconsistent. 
Fix some t with 0 t < t 1 . 
Using the implicit function theorem we can nd t 1 and t 2 as functions of t; S c and S f from We can now verify equations (14){(16).
It is easy to check that equation (16) which is satis ed for k f > k c .
Equation (15) 
Fix some t with 0 t < t 1 .
At t 3 the price must reach the choke price p, so that k f + f e rt 3 = p (B4)
The price path is continuous at t 1 , so that 
We also have 
We must also have (see Groot et al. (1992) Using the implicit function theorem we can nd t 1 ; t 2 and t 3 as functions of t; S c and S f from (B7), (B8) and (B9), where S c and S f denote the stocks at time t. The value function of the cartel is then implicitly de ned by
The restrictions with respect to the stocks are 
The pro ts of the cartel, from time t onwards with 0 t < t 1 , are First we claim G(x; y) = xG x (x; y) + yG y (x; y) ? xF x (x; y) ? yF y (x; y)
